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Abstract
some of the spatial properties of surfaces can be translated by touch as well as vision. both blind 
and clearsighted people can equally perceive corners and edges; their minds being equally capable of 
recognizing objects or arrangements of these. a fundamental difference, however, must be kept in mind: 
while most of the time the visual system readily homogenizes sensitive data through unity constructing, the 
haptic system usually «makes experiments» across time, which can be unified by a rule of interpretation 
only afterwards. Those are two different kinds of logic: visually knowing an object — or arrangement of 
objects — is to perceive it from general to particular, and tactilely knowing an object — or arrangement 
of objects — is to perceive it from particular to general. in this paper, with the theoretical background of 
peircean semiotics, we address the issue of how touch [predominantly inductive] and vision [predominantly 
deductive] are complementary perceptual/critical senses ecologically connected. such senses can be 
intersemiotically translated, as outline drawings demonstrate. a map produced for clearsighted and blind 
persons will be examined in an attempt to show how diagrammatical reasoning can be developed from 
predominantly deductive or inductive cognitive processes, and possibly share common representations for 
haptic and visual systems. 
Keywords: 1) peircean semiotics; 2) diagrammatical reasoning; 3) induction; 4) deduction; 5)t ouch; 6) 
vision 
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PEIRCE’S CONCEPTION OF DIAGRAM: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
The american philosopher charles s. Peirce (1839-1914) proposed a science to explain how 
everything that is perceived — which he named phaneron — could be understood as language 
or logic: semiotics. This abstract and general discipline is composed of a complex system made 
of sixty-six classes of signs (borges, 2007), each one corresponding to a pattern of cognition. 
Before further exploring this field, we should briefly examine Peirce’s phenomenology. 
according to Peirce, there are three universal categories that can be found in every single 
phenomenon: firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Firstness concerns «the ideas of freshness, 
life, freedom» (cP 1.302), a sui generis monad (CP 1. 303); secondness, is related to the dyadic 
opposition of forces, the «element of struggle», «effort» (cP1.322, 8.330), which is inherent to 
existence; thirdness is defined as a triadic representation (CP 1. 339), the mediation (CP 1.328) 
between possibilities — first — and facts — second —. It might be said these categories are 
interrelated in the following way: «The category of first can be prescinded from second and 
third, and second can be prescinded from third. But second cannot be prescinded from first, 
nor third from second» (cP 1. 353). 
describing how each of those categories are renamed and reviewed in semiotics is not 
within the scope of this paper[1]. one must take into account, nevertheless, that the category of 
thirdness or mediation — which already includes secondness and firstness — is the one identi-
fied with the concept of genuine sign (CP 2.92), the bilateral action of guiding potentiality into 
individual facts (cP 1.328), in which the cognitive or intelligible world is circumscribed. 
since semiotics is the domain of logic, it is instrumental not only to describe the phe-
nomenon but, also, to analyze it, revealing the hidden features that operate on everything that 
appears to the mind. a mind that, for Peirce, is not reduced to human mind, since is not nec-
essarily connected to a brain, and includes, for example, «the work of bees, of crystals, and 
throughout the purely physical world» (CP 4.551; Santaella, 1994: 399). 
From the sixty-six peircean sign classes, there is the mathematical possibility of 59.049 
kinds of signs (CP 1.291; Santaella, 1989: 62). Amongst these, addressing only one specific 
sign class is sufficient for our purposes: the diagram, a hypoicon. Peirce (CP 2. 276) postulates 
that pure icons are «ideas» of their objects, tied up to the domain of firstness — the universe 
of possibilities, which have not yet been embodied as secondness and brought into existence. 
a sign may have, however, a predominant iconical aspect, «that is, may represent its object 
mainly by its similarity» (ibid.), which Peirce calls hypoicons; these can be 
…roughly divided according to the mode of Firstness of which they partake. Those which 
partake of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the 
relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in 
their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative character of a repre-
sentamen by representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors (cP 2.277). 
[1] For a detailed approach, see santaella (2004).
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diagrams are not pure icons (cP 3.362), but representations that build — cognitive — 
relations between the internal connections of the sign and the internal connections of the repre-
sented object[2], such as graphs and maps (cP 3.419, 4.419), signs that mediate predominantly 
schematic reasoning [3] (cP 2.778, 2.782). 
VISION AND TACT AS DIFFERENT AND COMPLEMENTARY DATA SOURCES FOR 
REASONING 
now that the conception of diagrammatical reasoning has been introduced, we move on to 
considering vision and tact. The aim is not to explore the way eye and touch are physiologi-
cally and/or biochemically constituted and integrated to the brain, but understanding how they 
work, respectively, as schematic distinct and complementary data sources for predominantly 
deductive and inductive reasoning, conceiving data as the set of phenomena perceived by the 
mind, or phanerons. 
First, one must take into account that vision and tact have a lot in common. The… 
…spatial properties of surfaces are accessible by touch as well as by vision. The hand can feel 
corners and edges that the eye can see. if many properties are perceived by both touch and vision, 
then it is reasonable to conjecture that the tactile and visual perceptual systems share many of 
the same operating principles for perceiving the shape of our surroundings. (…) a table is both 
a visual table and a tactile table (Kennedy, 1993: 3). 
despite its seeming admissibility, the idea of a «symmetrical» mediated tactile and visual 
world finds several oppositions. The great mistake is to suppose «that touchers have trouble 
unifying a set of touches» (dunlea apud Kennedy, 1993: 4), and that…
…they cannot easily gain an overall impression of a complex shape, or the spatial layout of 
a set of objects, or the arrangement of rooms in a house (Katz, 1989, sect. 46). Touch needs 
guidance from vision, it is claimed. Touch is inadequate for organizing, and it provides a poor 
basis for attempts to remember spatial patterns. It is inherently less efficient than vision (Bailes 
and lambert, 1986, criticize this view) (Kennedy, 1993:4). 
Tact is often conceived as a «tool» for visual perception, or a less capable sense — even 
without any scientific evidence. This could be related to the fact that vision — the perception 
of light — is culturally identified with intelligence (Santos, 2008). In philosophy, since Greek 
[2] Farias (2008), however, points out that diagrammatical problematization in Peirce’s earlier works 
include pure icons. sometimes, «the concepts of ‘diagram’ and ‘icon’ seems to overlap (cP 2282, 7467 [1893] 
2279 [1895] 3429 [1896]), or diagrams are presented as examples of icon (eP2: 303 [1904] 4531 [1905]) and 
vice versa (W6: 258-259 [1889])» (ibid.). For this paper, only the hypoiconical dimension of diagrams is taken 
into account.
[3] a synonym of diagram.
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Antique, names like Plotin establish direct links between eye and mind; in daily life, expressions 
such as «clarify», «illuminate» or «observe» also reinforce the biased connections visual-intel-
ligible/ non visual-ignorant (ibid.). Scientific evidences, however, suggest a different scenario: 
«in one assessment of manual skill, Klatzky, lederman, and Metzger (…) found that adult 
subjects could identify 100 common objects with very few errors in a mean response time less 
than two seconds» (Kennedy, 1993: 14).
even the crystallized distinction that theorizes tact as «proximal» and vision as «distal» 
senses can be easily rejected. «Just as we can see through a transparent surface-looking (…) 
we can feel through a nearby surface to detect a more distant object» (ibid.: 12). it is the case, 
for example, of the «pressures generated by the wind of passage of a [distal] train» (ibid.). in 
fact, everything that rubs, presses and gets in contact with touch — the union of the cutaneous 
system and deeper regions of the body [kinesthetic system of joints, tendons and muscles], 
plus mobility (ibid.:11-12,15) —, or that is lifted, enclosed or held is able to be perceived by 
tactile senses. Touch includes equally passive and active, «proximal» and «distal» stimula-
tion, just as vision does — the latter, since Gibson (1986), understood no more as a merely 
receptor, but exploratory active system: «eyes-in-the-head-on-the-body-resting-on-the-ground» 
(ibid.: 205). 
The body explores the surrounding environment by locomotion; the head explores the 
ambient array by turning; and the eyes explore the two samples of the array, the fields 
of view, by eye movements. (…) The observer needs to look around, to look at, to focus 
sharply, and to neglect among light. (…) The visual system hunts for comprehension and 
clarity. (ibid.: 219). 
a crucial difference must be explained, nevertheless. although touch «deals with the 
shapes of individual objects and the arrangement of objects in many of the same way vision 
does» (Kennedy, 1993:5), these senses use different kinds of logic. Plaza (1987: 57) helps us 
realizing why. He points out that vision is wide, and homogenizes through unity constructing; 
tact, on the other hand, is narrow, and «makes us perceive differences by contrast (…), the 
experience accentuated by the interval between the objects» (ibid.). in other words: visually 
knowing an object — or arrangement of objects — is to perceive it from general to particu-
lar, while tactually knowing an object — or arrangement of objects — is to perceive it from 
particular to general. 
imagine a huge cube plastic box inside a room. When an adult looks at it, an explanation 
arises immediately: «it is a glass or plastic cube», it might be thought. Through the visual chan-
nel, almost effortlessly, the mind is supplied with multiple data, such as color, shape, texture, 
size and deepness, which readily provide elements that are converted into knowledge — signs 
— and translated into an explanation or law — other signs — to categorize the phenomenon. 
if, otherwise, the same plastic box was investigated only by tact, the cognitive process would 
be different. The first impression concerns maybe the material of the object, its texture, hard-
ness or temperature. as its size prevents it from being grasped, it must be touched piece by 
piece, several times, separately uncovering its faces, being opened and closed, in an effort to 
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perceive a shape. only after this process someone would be able to synthesize all the inputted 
data, which a short while ago seemed like particular disintegrated experiences, and make an 
affirmation: «It is a plastic box», a blind or blindfolded man could say.
When vision was used to analyze the box, a predominantly deductive reasoning (cP 
7.203) operated: the image in front of the eyes did not take any long to become an explanation 
of the perceived object; a rule of interpretation — thirdness — guided the result beforehand. 
Tact, however, led the mind into a predominantly inductive knowledge process (cP 7.206), that 
is to say, provided fragmented data by successive experimentation across time (Duarte, 1995; 
2001; 2004; Gibson apud Kennedy, 1993: 4; Sacks, 1995: 138), which only afterwards could be 
unified; the result — of the experimentation, facts, secondness — led to a rule of interpretation. 
Those are, certainly, tendencies of vision and tact as data sources, not meaning they cannot 
swap positions — vision becoming predominantly inductive and tact predominantly deductive 
— or even produce predominantly abduction, «an explanatory hypothesis» (cP 5.171), merely 
preparatory (cP 7.218), which is, «after all, nothing but guessing» (cP 7.219), the suggestion 
of a theory (cP 8.209). 
consider, for example, a child who is playing with a puzzle. He or she inductively 
seeks to associate the pieces, starting with merging them erratically by plugging and con-
necting two or three unities, after that organizing them as small groups, in an attempt to set 
fragments according to a predetermined visual representation. in addition, someone trained 
to read in Braille quickly fits each set of points perceived by the touch of the fingers as a 
different letter or symbol, because previously that person learned how to frame this kind of 
experience into interpretation rules; this is deduction. Abduction, moreover, entails that at 
any time and everywhere, someone can see or touch/be touched by something unexpected 
which then becomes a discovery — like a probable new color or texture —, providing data for 
the reformulation of the phenomenological theories (CP 5.145; 7.218) of interpretation that, 
afterwards, become — deductive — rules and will have to be validated by — inductive— tests 
(cP 5.171). 
This semiotic process starts as a perceptual judgment, «the first judgment of a person 
as to what is before his senses» (CP 5.115), a «starting point or first premise of all critical and 
controlled thinking» (cP 5.181), «without [, however,] any controlled and criticized action of 
reasoning» (cP 5.157). indeed, Perceptual judgments «are to be regarded as an extreme case of 
abductive inferences, from which they differ in being absolutely beyond criticism» (cP 5.181): 
«There are mental operations which are as completely beyond our control as the growth of 
our hair. To approve or disapprove of them would be idle» (CP 5.130); this is the universe of 
belief, which has no place in science (CP 5.60; Peirce apud Santaella, 2005: 353; Santaella, 
2004: 47) or critical reasoning.
Reaching further than perceptual judgment, genuine critical judgment — thirdness that 
critically mediates what appears to the mind — contains invariably deducible universal propo-
sitions [criticism of law]: «under certain conditions certain phenomena ought to appear» (cP 
2.775), in accord with inductive experience (cP 6.472) [criticism of experience], the necessary 
examination of a hypotheses originated from abduction [criticism of feeling], «an act of insight, 
although of extremely fallible insight» (cP 5.181). schematically: 
touCh and vision: some Considerations for diaGrammatiCal reasoninG 
1302
Whereas «deduction proves that something must be [law]; Induction shows that some-
thing actually is operative [experience]; Abduction merely suggests that something may be 
[feeling]» (cP 5.171). and they all work omnipresently in tact and vision, not just perceptual, 
but also in critical senses: «Reasoning cannot possibly be divorced from logic» (cP 5.108), just 
as logic cannot be detached from perception (Rosenthal, 1990: 197). senses are not simple front 
gates; they are critical explorative minds, endowed with different intelligences. «The elements of 
every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate 
of purposive [critical] action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates 
is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason» (cP 5.212). These «purposive [critical] action» is 
directly connected to what Gibson (1986) named «exploratory active aspect» of the perceptive 
system: the critique has to be made on the phenomenon with both cognitive-sensuous skills. 
it is important to say, nevertheless, especially assuming Gibson’s (1986) ecological 
approach to perception, that there are no isolated perceptive organs, but integrated synaesthetic 
sensorial operations. Each sense would be responsible for a different type of data input; how-
ever, since they are interrelated, they could share the predominantly abductive, deductive and 
inductive inputted phanerons from each other, constituting an «extended complex mind», or 
an ecological perceptual system — to use Gibson’s terminology. one same data or phaneron, 
in this way, could be read in its different meanings by all the senses working together simul-
taneously and interconnected to the nervous system, forming a single network of knowledge 
(Gibson, 1986: 4). Therefore, even if vision can operate inductively and touch deductively 
— two diagrammatical different kinds of data organization —, it is suggested that they do not 
usually follow this procedure because they — or the synaesthetic sensorial mind — can access 
the missing cognitive data from other senses. 
it follows that, as deduction and induction are complementary kinds of reasoning, once 
the former traces out through a law of interpretation the necessary and probable experimental 
consequences of a hypothesis (cP 7.203), and the later validates this rule in the empirical world 
(CP 7.206), vision and touch are not trapped within antagonistic loci; they are, rather, interrelated 
and interdependent: What is seen and categorized by the visual system is tested and endorsed 
by haptics, and vice-versa. Thinking on the example of the box which was given previously, the 
person who saw the object and concluded it was a glass or plastic cube would have a chance, 
by touch, not just to confirm it was a cube but, as well, to be sure it was exclusively made of 
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plastic — not glass — and, in addition, a box that could be opened — not an ordinary cube. 
The one who was touching, after aided by vision, would be able to confirm that the perceived 
object was a plastic box, and not an aquarium or something other. 
compared to vision, tact uses a predominantly or preferential different mode of data 
perception/organization: induction; and it is not the opposite or simplification of — visual — 
deduction, or even less it’s instrumental to it; it is, unlikely, its complement, in the same way 
abduction is. any critical judgment — synonymous of sign — has to be a law [3] of interpreta-
tion that mediates between critical judgment of feeling [1] and critical judgment of experience 
[2] — even when, many times, those borders are not well defined or, better, non-identified. 
That means not only that tact and vision can and must work together as data sources 
— also connected to other senses —, but also translating visual into tactile data amounts to 
translating predominantly deductive reasoning into predominantly inductive reasoning, and 
translating tactile into visual data amounts to translating predominantly inductive reasoning 
into predominantly deductive reasoning. How is that possible? What is necessary to turn a 
phenomenon perceived through the eyes intelligible to the skin, or the other way around? The 
mediation of a semiosis or, precisely, an intersemiotical translation, is my argument. 
Peirce (cP 5.283-5.284) argues that any sign is the translation of a thought into another 
thought, ad infinitum. When, however, this process involves different kinds of languages, such 
as the ones from visual and tactile systems, it is renamed as an intersemiosis (Plaza, 1987: 12). 
For the present case — touch [induction]/vision [deduction] —, outline drawings have been 
successfully used for a long time. 
OUTLINE DRAWINGS AS INTERFACE FOR VISUAL AND TACTILE REASONING 
For over three decades, Professor John M. Kennedy, from the university of Toronto, has 
been comparing drawings made by sighted and blind people. in a paper published in 1997, in 
Scientific American, titled How the Blind Draw, he presented some conclusions of this research, 
proposing similarities between the pictorial language used in sketching their surroundings by 
those who receive visual and tactile data: 
…for example, both groups use lines to represent the edges of surfaces. both employ fores-
hortened shapes and converging lines to convey depth. both typically portray scenes from a 
single vantage point. both render extended or irregular lines to connote motion. and both use 
shapes that are symbolic, though not always visually correct, such as a heart or a star, to relay 
abstract messages. In sum, our work shows that even very basic pictures reflect far more than 
meets the eye (Kennedy, 1997: 77).
one special raised-line drawing kit[4] is used to allow blind persons to depict what they 
can fell with their senses, specially the haptics system. but the success of the procedure is 
[4] «These kits are basically stiff boards covered with a layer of rubber and a thin plastic sheet. The pressure 
from any ballpoint pen produces a raised line on the plastic sheet» (Kennedy, 1997: 77).
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not entirely due to this technical apparatus — the predominantly indexical/material sphere —; 
here, the power of pictures to communicate is preponderant (Kennedy, 1974: 1-13), a language 
apprehensible for both sighted and sightless, specially on outline pictures, «useful for present-
ing essential details with a minimum of irrelevancy. in an outline drawing, key facts about the 
sizes, shapes, and locations of objects can be shown in a form of representation that requires 
less training than any code» (ibid.: 155). 
lines are full of information - differences (ashby, 1970). They mark abrupt changes 
(Kennedy, 1974: 106-133), like surface discontinuities[5] of shape, deepness and texture, building 
frontiers equally accessible to touch and vision, and responsible for the perception of corners 
and edges. Therefore, raised contour makes it possible to tactile/visually depict the different 
objects or arrangement of objects of which the environment is composed, building representa-
tions readable inductively or deductively. 
on one hand, a single glance reveals a set of lines that can be readily translated as a 
complete and unified picture, where it is possible to see the existence of individual elements 
as a unified and almost instantly intelligible representation — a predominantly deductively 
cognition. on another hand, lines are ready to show slowly and individually, across time, 
every detail that composes an object or arrangement of objects, which are later translated into 
a critical judgment — a predominantly inductively cognition. 
OUTLINE MAP: DIAGRAM FOR BLIND AND SIGHTED PEOPLE 
in the picture below, you can see a visual-tactile map, made for the use of blind and sighted 
people: 
[5] some discontinuities, like pigment, can be only perceived through vision, and others, like illumination 
—chiaroscuro — cannot be depicted with outlines (Kennedy, 1993: 32).
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diagrammatically, analogies are constructed in the map to represent the spatial layout of 
a bank first floor. Raised-lines that can be seen and touched inform customers about the loca-
tion of services, indicated by graphic and written — braille plus ordinary western alphabet — 
captions. While sighted people are able to view this entire map in a very short time, blind per-
sons have to perceive its components apart, inductively trying to organize what their fingers 
feel. both processes, however, have potential to lead the mind into a same rule of interpretation 
or sign: the general layout of the bank first floor. 
That happens because outlines used in the map depict where the corners and edges that 
composes the environment are. although these outlines have nothing in common with the 
bank floor appearance, they are diagrammatically successful in representing how the space is 
organized. after knowing being the «X» on the map, someone would be able not just to self-
localize, but also discover the position of the bank services and move to them. eyes and hands, 
deduction and induction: they all work successfully for diagrammatical reasoning. 
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